TURKEY'S QUEST FOR PEACEFUL
NUCLEAR POWER T hirty years ago, Turkey launched the first feasibility studies for a nuclear power plant with a view to benefit from peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. However, neither that nor subsequent attempts have come to fruition for a variety of reasons, ranging in part from a lack of a welldefined national strategy in this area to domestic political problems. But the most significant hurdle has been the Western countries' fear of a retransfer of nuclear material and technology from Turkey to third parties. Specifically, the United States has feared a Turkish-Pakistani connection. India and Greece have further fueled these fears by disseminating rumors about such a connection. As a result, the United States has put pressure on supplier countries and firms to deny transfers of nuclear reactors and related technology to Turkey.
Notwithstanding the allegations of a Pakistani connection, Turkey became a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by signing it on January 29,1969, and ratifying it on April 17,1980. Turkey concluded a "full-scope" safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1982. In accordance with its foreign and security policy, 2 Turkey has also become a state party to international agreements that seek to prevent the spread of all sorts of weapons of mass destruction, such as the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, held in New York in April/May 1995, Turkey gave its full support to the "indefinite and unconditional extension" of the Treaty. Turkey also used its influence on the Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus to induce them to behave the same way. More recently, Turkey assumed a full member status in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva after a long period of attending the meetings as an observer. As a country that never sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction, Turkey has endorsed efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the verification mechanisms of the IAEA. Therefore, Turkey pays close attention to the proceedings of the IAEA's "Programme 93+2," in its efforts to make IAEA safeguards inspections more comprehensive. Above all, Turkey has been a "staunch ally" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries since 1952 and has carried a significant portion of the burden of defending the West against the Soviet Union. 3 Thus, the opposition of the United States (as well as of Canada and Germany) to Turkey's attempts to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy is difficult to understand.
Turkey is a rapidly growing country, and its present and forecasted energy needs extend well beyond its currently installed power generating capacity. Despite outstanding success in completing power generation projects in the 1970s and 1980s, Turkey now suffers from frequent power outages that have caused serious losses, especially to its industrial output. Since the early 1990s, Turkey has not been able to finance dozens of projects of different sizes that would further exploit its power generating potential. But these efforts are likely only to postpone the energy crisis it will soon face unless it resorts to sources of energy other than those traditionally exploited thus far. That is, Turkey's hydropower and thermal energy sources will not be sufficient to meet the steady increase in its energy requirements in the decades to come. Currently, Turkey has a population of approximately 65 million, and an estimated population of 85 million in 2010. 4 Turkey has insignificant reserves of oil and natural gas and thus is dependent on other countries. But Turkey has other sources of energy, such as hydro power, coal, geothermal, wind, and solar, as well as considerable reserves of uranium and thorium. Of all these, however, only hydro power and coal have been properly exploited over the past few decades. 5 Research indicates that demand will again exceed domestic supply in the early 2000s.
6 Consequently, resorting to peaceful exploitation of nuclear power is currently being discussed and will continue to come to the fore as an alternative strategy for Turkey to diversify its primary sources of energy. This article will explore how and why Turkey has not succeeded in installing a substantial nuclear power infrastructure, despite serious efforts over the last three decades. It will discuss the reasons behind the failure of past attempts and make recommendations for guiding further Turkish efforts to acquire nuclear power and technology. 7 It argues that the fear of Western supplier countries of alleged Pakistani connections has had a negative effect on Turkey's initiatives in the past. Thus, it makes the case that Turkey's current tender for nuclear reactors could be a timely opportunity for both the West and Turkey to mend these relations. 8 Finally, it concludes that if Western countries are to be expected to assign a higher priority to Turkey's energy requirements, Turkey must be willing to take steps toward greater transparency in its nuclear-related transactions and activities.
TURKEY'S ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT NUCLEAR ENERGY & ALLEGATIONS OF AN ILLICIT PAKISTANI CONNECTION
Turkey's attempts to exploit peaceful nuclear power have been shadowed by allegations of its illicit cooperation with Pakistan. Thus, these two developments will be discussed together in chronological order. Turkey began thinking about the development of peaceful nuclear energy after Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative speech before the U.N. General Assembly in 1953, and the Geneva Conference of 1955. Many of the secrets in the nuclear field were disclosed during the conference, particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union, to allow more countries to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In 1956, the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEC) was established under the auspices of the Prime Ministry to coordinate efforts to build nuclear research and training centers, and to issue licenses for nuclear power plants.
First Phase: The 1960s & 1970s
In 1961, Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center (CNRTC), the first nuclear research and training center in Turkey, was established. That was followed by the installation of a one megawatt thermal (MWth) pool-type research reactor TR-1 in CNRTC a year later. 9 Then, in 1966, Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Center (ANRTC) was established in the environs of the capital, as the second major branch of TAEC, for carrying out "fundamental and applied research to use nuclear energy and technology for the benefit of the country and to support the national development."
10 With a view to exploit Turkey's natural uranium reserves, the first feasibility studies for the construction of a 300 to 400 megawatt electric (MWe) pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) were launched in 1967 in order to start generating electricity by the year 1977. However, domestic economic and political developments halted that initiative." In a second attempt, the Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) division of the Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK)-which had undergone a reorganization in 1970-carried out comprehensive feasibility, site selection, and bid specification studies between 1972 and 1974 for a 600 MWe nuclear power plant.
12 Surveys for the selection of 
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The total cost of these three units was estimated to be $3.4 billion.
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Talks with Canadian and German Firms
Preliminary results of the site surveys conducted in Sinop by an expert team dispatched by General Electric, as well as the team's consultations with experts from the IAEA and from Turkey, who had previously carried out similar studies in the region, concluded that a nuclear power plant was not feasible. They determined that, without conducting much more elaborate and comprehensive studies to assess the impact of the fault lines deep in the Black Sea basin on the probability of an earthquake in the region, no further steps could be taken to construct a nuclear site. Hence, negotiations with General Electric came to an end. However, negotiations with AECL and KWU continued throughout 1984, and the parties agreed to several points for the preparation of contract documents and the financing schemes for a turnkey approach. At that time, the newly established government in Turkey suggested a so-called "builtoperate-transfer" (BOT) model for the supply of power reactors. The BOT model was launched with a view to attracting foreign investments to Turkey in many fields, and the nuclear deal was also considered in the same vein. With BOT, the Turkish government suggested that AECL and KWU construct the nuclear sites by forming joint venture utilities (JVU) with Turkey's TEK; operate the reactors for 15 years by selling the generated electricity to TEK; and then hand over their share in the nuclear site to TEK. Both AECL and KWU were also required to be responsible for a greater portion of financing of the power plants that they would build in the form of a JVU with TEK. 23 While both firms agreed in principle to such a plan, KWU would later decline to undertake the supply of the reactor, reportedly due to a disagreement about the financing conditions imposed by the Turkish government. Hence, AECL was left as the sole potential supplier for all three reactors. On January 3, 1985, Turkey reportedly invited AECL to conduct final negotiations for the supply of reactors for its Akkuyu and Sinop nuclear units. 24 The Canadian firm was said to have made serious attempts to find loan guarantees to finance the Akkuyu reactor and requested a $1 billion loan guarantee both from the Canadian government and banks. 25 However, negotiations with AECL ran into problems when the Canadian government failed to approve the plan. 26 The Canadian government requested government guarantees from Turkey for the financing, and submitted a proposal containing a credit package and certain conditions. But, the Turkish government did not find the proposal consistent with the requirements of the BOT scheme, and the deal was suspended. 27 Although the deal was declared to be terminated by the Turkish Minister of Energy Cahit Aral, an AECL official stated that his organization was still negotiating with Turkey for a contract to build and operate a CANDU reactor near Akkuyu. 28 But, another AECL official apparently admitted that "it [was] not possible for an agreement to be reached within the framework of a build-own-run formula with the Turkish government." 29 Yet, in January 1987, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was quoted as saying that Turkey was ready to evaluate further proposals from AECL to go ahead with the reactor deal. 30 And, in June 1987, it was reported that negotiations with AECL continued after the Canadian government failed to approve a plan for AECL to build the plant and run it for 15 years. It was also reported that talks with KWU were reopened. 31 Nevertheless, none of these talks have come to fruition, not only because of financial problems, but also because of political considerations of the Canadian and German governments. The main reason behind the withdrawal of KWU from the deal was probably the reaction of the West German government to Turkey's improving relations with East Germany. Although such a view cannot be attributed to any official communication or document, it was perceived in Turkish diplomatic circles. With regard to the Canadian firm, it was reported that AECL had withdrawn its bid for a nuclear plant "in response to pressure from Western countries which [are] concerned that Turkey may build a nuclear bomb based on CANDU technology."
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Opposition from Greece, Israel, and France resulted in a deadlock in efforts to procure financing for the project. 33 Western countries feared that Turkey would do what Pakistan did-modify the technology to gain the capability to build an atomic bomb. 34 Allegations increased especially in the aftermath of the interview of Abdel Qader Khan, a key figure in Pakistan's nuclear program, with an Indian journalist in March 1987. Thereafter, in a press conference held on October 28, 1987, Ambassador Inal Batu, then-spokesperson of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explicitly denied re-ports that Turkey would sell material for nuclear arms production to Pakistan. Ambassador Batu said that "Turkey fulfilled with great care its obligations under the NPT." 35 Later, Indian sources reported that the Indian government was looking over reports that Turkey was illegally selling nuclear weapons-related materials to Pakistan. Kapil Verma, a member of the Congress-I Party, was quoted as saying that "India should try to persuade the Turkish government to give up their strategic nuclear equipment."
36 In mid-1988, Leonard S. Spector, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, reportedly indicated that "although the United States had put an end to the smuggling of sensitive material by Pakistan, both India and Pakistan had accumulated the nuclear materials necessary for bomb production." 37 Building upon Spector's views, Indian authorities argued that "Turkey was used as an intermediary in many of Pakistan's clandestine activities," even though Spector did not cite any country's name. 38 
Talks with Argentine Firms
When talks with Canadian and German firms for the construction of nuclear power plants ran into trouble, Turkey sought other partners in the nuclear field. Hence, Turkey signed a 15-year nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina on May 3,1988. The agreement paved the way for potential transfers from Argentina of technical assistance, including front-end nuclear fuel cycle research and development; and research on power and research reactor planning, construction, quality assurance, operation, and regulation. IAEA safeguards would apply to all nuclear material designed for the use of nuclear technology to be transferred under the accord. Turkey and Argentina also agreed that safeguards on Argentine supplies would continue even if the agreement expired. At the same time, Turkey became interested in the 380 MWe Argos PWR design unveiled a year earlier by Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas (ENACE). 39 Argentina agreed to help Turkey study the feasibility of a site for Argos in Turkey. As part of this agreement, Turkish scientists and technicians would go to Argentina's Bariloche Nuclear Center for training. The two countries explored other areas for cooperation, including uranium mining, nuclear fuel plants, industrial production of radioisotbpes, and safety requirements. 40 Turkey also sought an agreement with Argentina for the construction of an Argentine-made 25 MWe nuclear reactor, the CAREM-25, in Ankara. Professor Atilla Ozmen, then-director of TAEA, stated that "the offer [ 45 The long-term goal of the joint venture was to export the reactor to other nations in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. 46 Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and the Argentine President Carlos Menem had corresponded and met regarding the project, and hence played a key role in obtaining agreement.
Despite the fact that elaborate and high-level talks in the nuclear field have been held between Argentina and Turkey and have culminated in a formal document, no progress has been made. Reportedly, Argentina's decision in the early 1980s to appoint Adolfo Saracho, a former head of Argentina's nuclear energy commission, the new Ambassador to Ankara, made "the United States, the Soviet Union, and German diplomatic missions in Buenos Aires uneasy." 47 When Turkey and Argentina agreed in October 1990 to set up a joint venture company to build CAREM-25 reactors in each country, "the United States, the Soviet Union, and Germany believed that Turkey's acquisition of nuclear technology would be disadvantageous." 48 Hence, the United States was said to have "worried because of the fears that Turkey might sell this technology to Pakistan." 49 William Rope, first undersecretary at the U.S. embassy, has reportedly made several calls trying to determine how nuclear cooperation between Turkey and Argentina would affect other countries in the region, particularly Pakistan.
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Although the formal agreement for nuclear cooperation with Argentina is still in force, the CAREM-25 project was canceled a year later by a unilateral decision of executives at TAEA. Professor Yalcin Sanalan, then-director of TAEA, was especially influential in the decision. He notes that "[he] found the prospects of the CAREM-25 deal ambiguous" on the grounds that "CAREM-25 was too small for electricity generation and too big for research or training, however, very suitable for plutonium production" and thus a proliferation concern. Therefore, Professor Sanalan "concluded that such an ambiguous project would decrease the chances of Turkey in its current and future quest for largescale nuclear power plants which the country really needed." In Professor Sanalan's words, "when TAEA declared that it unilaterally canceled the CAREM-25 project, [he] as the director of TAEA was then frequently invited to 'inner circle' meetings and dinners of the OECD/ NEA." Professor Sanalan also notes that "the OECD countries then openly expressed in these meetings their wishes to help Turkey acquire nuclear power plants, provided the latter had well defined objectives in that area."
51 By implication, the OECD countries prior to and after the unilateral cancellation of the CAREM-25 project by Turkey, were concerned about proliferation problems if Turkey acquired advanced nuclear technology and material.
Third Phase: The 1990s
Despite the concerns of Western nuclear supplier countries about Turkey's acquisition of nuclear power plants and thus advanced nuclear technology, Turkish experts continued to make estimates in the early 1990s of the amount of nuclear energy that Turkey will need in the next decades. Figures provided by experts indicate that, in order to meet Turkey'sever growing energy needs, a 1,000 MWe capacity per annum should become operational as of 2005. Total installed nuclear power capacity should reach 34,000 MWe by 2040. Experts came to this conclusion by considering both the estimated population growth rate and the yearly increase in energy consumption in Turkey during the first half of the 21st century. Hence, an approximate and rather stable 5,000 (kWh) per capita consumption (based on a population of 110 million in the year 2040) will result in the need for 550 (TWh) energy by then. But, since total electricity production by domestic resources will barely attain the 320 TWh level, then the difference (i.e., 230 TWh) will have to be generated by relying on various non-domestic sources. Given that a 1,000 MWe nuclear reactor capacity can generate 6,750 MWh electricity per annum, operating on average at 70 percent productivity, then 34,000 MWe installed capacity would yield an estimated energy generation of 230 TWh in 2040. 52 Although the above scenario envisions a solution to Turkey's long-term energy needs, installation of some 35 large-scale nuclear power plants seems very unlikely, and not only because of technical or financial constraints. Fears of a Pakistani connection appear to still exist in 1997 linked to the fact that Pakistan reportedly succeeded in assembling one or more nuclear explosive devices in the early 1990s, or will soon have the capability to do so. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Turkey's intensified relations with the Turkic republics in Central Asia and Caucasus, some of which have nuclear installations, have only increased the West's concerns.
One of the most significant accusations regarding Turkey's alleged role in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1990s came from U.S. Senator John Glenn. In his article published in The Washington Post on June 24,1992, Senator Glenn pointed to the history of the Reagan and Bush administrations in dealing with the issue of nuclear proliferation in regards to Pakistan. Senator John Glenn and Senator Stuart Symington had amended the Foreign Assistance Act in 1977 so that no country could receive U.S. aid if it imported or exported unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment or reprocessing materials or equipment. In 1979, U.S. aid to Pakistan was cut off for violations of this act. Senator Glenn claimed that "the credibility of the Bush and Reagan administrations' commitment to nuclear nonproliferation has been destroyed by their willful misinterpretation of the U.S. laws." 53 He said "U.S. assistance allowed Pakistan to divert funds to its nuclear program, thus damaging the nuclear nonproliferation effort." 54 In that context, Senator Glenn also mentioned the "failure of the GlennSymington amendment to stop aid to Turkey, because of its involvement in aiding Pakistan in its acquisition of uranium enrichment equipment." 55 As a reaction to Senator Glenn's accusations, Turkish officials promptly denied that Turkey was supplying Pakistan with sensitive equipment used in the production of nuclear weapons. Also in 1992, U.S. congressmen reportedly accused Turkey of helping Pakistan with its nuclear program.
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A more recent concern about the possibility of a Turkish-Pakistani connection and Turkey's alleged nuclear weapons ambitions, came from Greece. Thanos Dokos from the Greek Foreign Ministry states that "[although Turkey does not possess the technological capability to develop nuclear weapons in the near future, Greece is worried about the alleged nuclear cooperation between Ankara and Islamabad, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and (unconfirmed) reports that Turkey might try to acquire nuclear weapons material and technology and recruit nuclear scientists from the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union." 57 Other sources in Greece have disseminated information to the same effect. For instance, a Greek daily, IKathimerini, alleged that: "Turkey is attempting to acquire nuclear technology and nuclear warheads from the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union, and is trying to acquire nuclear potential by cooperating with Pakistan in particular. The government of Greece is therefore deeply concerned by the development." 58 In response, Ambassador Filiz Dincmen, then-spokeswoman of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that "no efforts had been made to obtain raw materials or technology used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia," and reiterated that "Turkey [was] a state party to the NPT and [had] fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA in force." 59 Although, the veracity of these allegations is highly suspicious, 60 their probable role in Turkey's failure to install nuclear power plants is worth serious consideration by the Turkish government if it hopes to avoid another backlash against initiatives to install such plants. Turkey's future energy production and consumption profiles indicate that peaceful exploitation of nuclear power may soon turn out to be a necessity for Turkey, although it should not be seen as a panacea.
Turkey's Recent Initiative for Installing Nuclear Power Plants
In early 1995, it was reported that request for bids to construct a nuclear power plant at the Akkuyu site would be issued during the year. Later, the Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission Company (TEAS) considered bids for a consultancy contract for the power plant project. TEAS was reported to have received bids from at least 14 consortia, including Turkish partner companies. In March 1995, the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), with a consortium of Korean companies and Turkish engineering firms, was said to be positioning itself as a contender in the upcoming bid to supply a nuclear plant to Turkey. KAERI had already begun work in Turkey in December 1994, along with Turkey's Gamb. 61 KAERI won the contract to evaluate the nuclear development program drawn up by TEAS. The contract's main objectives included: investigation of internationally accepted contemporary nuclear power plant types and systems feasible for Turkey; review of bids solicited during previous attempts to set up a nuclear program in Turkey; and consultation with TEAS during bid evaluations and contract negotiations.
62 KAERI examined the feasibility of renewing Turkey's project at Akkuyu. A review process was then scheduled for completion by mid-1996. A contractor will be selected by 1998, with construction scheduled to begin in late 1998. Atomic Energy of Canada is expected to offer a 680 MWe CANDU-6 heavy water reactor, and Siemens of Germany is likely to offer a 1,400 MWe pressurized water reactor. 63 According to the Turkish media, in December 1996, the Turkish government planned to accept bids for the nuclear plant to be built either as single unit with a capacity of 1,200 MWe or two equal units each with a capacity of 600 MWe. The cost of the plant is estimated to be about $1.5 billion. However, because of recent political developments in Turkey that resulted in the so called pro-Islamic government coming to power, bidders were said to be reluctant to go ahead with the nuclear power plant deal. On January 20, 1997, at the request of the companies, Turkey extended the deadline for bidding which expired that day. 64 Finally, the 
TECHNICAL & POLITICAL PITFALLS OF NON-NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVES
Turkey has learned little from its the past failures and has not taken measures to alleviate fears of Western nuclear supplier countries. Thus, Turkey's current attempt is likely to be another failure and a waste of time and resources. Why does Turkey still insist on installing nuclear power plants, particularly in light of heightened public awareness on nuclear and environmental issues in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster? Demonstrations against nuclear power plants have been staged sporadically both in big cities and the selected nuclear sites. Thus, conventional wisdom may suggest seeking alternative ways of generating electricity. There are, however, technical and political constraints on utilizing Turkey's other domestic sources of energy. There has not been a significant coordinated effort in Turkey to make use of geothermal, wind, or solar energy potential of the country. Full-fledge feasibility studies as to how to exploit these sources on a large-scale virtually do not exist. There has been plenty of rhetoric by successive government programs, but no concrete work has been accomplished. In addition, training a sufficient number of scientists, technicians, and administrators within the framework of master plans in these areas would take decades. 66 Nevertheless, these alternatives should be studied.
There are political implications, along with the financial and technical difficulties, if Turkey exploits its fresh water resources in its southern and eastern regions. 67 Construction of dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in southeastern Anatolia has always been a serious bone of contention between Turkey and its downstream neighbors, Syria and Iraq, as well as the Arab world. 68 Formal declarations of the Arab League summits accuse Turkey of "using water as a weapon" against the Arabs. A clear indication of this can be seen in their objections to the construction of the large-scale Keban and Karakaya dams in the 1960s and 1970s. Syria and Iraq have successfully lobbied in the Arab League in order to induce the latter to put pressure on international financial circles to block loans and assistance to Turkey's projects on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Hence, Ataturk dam, the fourth largest in the world, was constructed without any foreign financial or engineering aid. As a result, it has suffered from several delays and a considerable increases in total cost. 69 Against this background, it becomes clear that unless Turkey installs nuclear power plants as an alternative primary source of energy, it will resort increasingly to foreign sources of energy such as imported oil and natural gas. Both of these commodities, however, are quite expensive as well as less reliable because their availability is highly dependent on several factors, including the nature of international politics. Turkey has been using Russian natural gas primarily for heating in heavily populated cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Bursa. New projects are said to be underway to expand that network. However, as a result of the recently strained relations between the two countries, particularly over Chechen and Kurdish (PKK) issues, 70 negotiations for the renewal of the agreement that would also double the amount delivered to Turkey have been stalled for a considerable period. The strain has also jeopardized the overall effectiveness of the agreement. 71 Moreover, pipelines that will deliver natural gas and oil from Central Asia to the West appear highly unlikely to traverse Turkey because of the opposition of Russia, which is eager to host the pipelines.
72 Hence, with a view to diversify its sources of energy, Turkey concluded a $20 billion long-term natural gas agreement with Iran in August 1996. This new agreement prompted serious concerns in the West. The U.S. administration, in particular, considered such a move by the Turkish government as incompatible with its policy of containment of Iran, and asked Turkey not to go ahead with the deal. 73 Therefore, because of the complex political implications of further exploitation of Turkey's fresh water resources or reliance on Russian and Iranian natural gas, nuclear power development prevails as a technically and economically feasible, as well as a politically more viable, alternative. Moreover, environmental experts consider nuclear energy to be cleaner than thermal energy generated by fossil fuels that cause carbon dioxide emissions. With regard to nuclear infra-and superstructure, TAEC/TAEA and TEK/TEAS have gone through a learning process over the past three decades during the deliberations for nuclear technology transfer. Likewise, Turkish scientists, technicians, and administrators have accumulated a good deal of knowledge and experience in the nuclear field, and conducted studies, among other issues, on recovery of uranium from various districts of the country. Design studies on uranium extractors and uranium dioxide (UO2) powder production, as well as the operation of a pilot plant, proved successful, and the first pilot plant started to operate in late 1986 with 1.5 ton uranium concentrate imported from Canada. 74 Turkey's natural uranium and thorium deposits are said to be 8,400 tons and 380,000 tons, respectively, of which the former may constitute a basis for three 650 MWe pressurized heavy water reactors. 75 Thorium reserves may also be used for nuclear energy generation, provided the necessary technological steps are taken. All in all, a fertile soil exists in Turkey for peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
If successful, nuclear power generation will still be expensive and dependent on foreign assistance in many respects. However, Turkey's partners will be mainly its long-term allies, such as the United States, Canada, Germany, France, and Belgium, as well as its emerging trade partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Argentina, and Brazil. The pace of relations is less likely be affected by irrational political moves if both sides take the measures necessary to ensure that there are neither possibilities for diversion of technologies to Pakistan nor avenues for unsubstantiated rumor-mongering.
The primary duty to take corrective steps certainly rests on the side of Turkey. First and the foremost, the Turkish government should commission comprehensive studies with a view to work out a master plan regarding: the possible role of nuclear energy in Turkey's overall energy needs; the country's uranium, thorium, and other nuclear-related natural resource reserves; the selection of nuclear reactor types; and the identification of sites for the reactors that will be needed in the decades to come. 76 The master plan should be worked out fully using all of the necessary scientific and economic criteria. It should then be codified by law so as to make it immune to changes in the domestic political climate. The relevant cadres of scientists and technicians, whose institutes have been either abolished or hurt by bureaucratic transitions over the years, should again be gathered together and oriented towards a well' defined, civilian nuclear energy program. To complement this, Turkey should express its eagerness to accede to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to abide by its guidelines by passing the necessary export control laws. 77 These new laws could hurt Turkey's industrial exports. 78 However, the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear energy, such as plentiful and relatively cheap electricity, may offset these costs. Informed cadres in the nuclear field should take steps to create and then develop a proper nuclear culture in all respects (e.g., nuclear safety, nonproliferation, and environmental protection). Above all, Turkish politicians, public servants, and other officials must be briefed about international concerns pertaining especially to nuclear nonproliferation. Before putting the blame on external actors for Turkey's difficulties to date in acquiring nuclear technology, Turkey must adopt the necessary domestic measures to silence those concerns.
As for the corrective actions suggested for the Western nuclear supplier countries, some new thinking should be applied regarding the treatment of Turkey. Western countries should assign a much higher priority to Turkey's energy requirements. They should consider the socio-political as well as the foreign policy implications of the possible deterioration of Turkey's economy in case of a serious energy crisis. Such a crisis might have unanticipated and unprecedented consequences not only for Turkey, but for the broader region. A few Turkish politicians have made irresponsible and reckless statements in the past that have added impetus to rumors about possible misuses of a would-be nuclear capability of Turkey. However, their significance should not be exaggerated. Turkey is a democratic country and, although they might be less developed than those in advanced countries in the West, checks and balances do exist. Moreover, Turkey, as a state party to the NPT, is and will be subject to the IAEA's scrutiny according to its obligations under the "full-scope" safeguards agreement in force since 1982. Furthermore, cadres of Turkish scientists, scholars, and technicians with solid backgrounds and advanced education in the fields of nuclear engineering and nuclear physics from the world's best institutes are well aware of the political implications of improper use of nuclear technologies. If these guidelines are followed by the relevant parties, thre should be no grounds for Turkey to be neglected by the West any longer. 
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